Reply Obj. 2:  Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter.  Now it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one another.  Consequently in every sorrow the subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure:  because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it.  And therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure:  but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.  Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects:  since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort. ________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 5]

Whether There Is Any Sorrow Contrary to the Pleasure of Contemplation?

Objection 1:  It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.  For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10):  “The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.”  Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 3, 4).  Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Obj. 2:  Further, contrary things have contrary effects.  If therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other contrary will give sorrow:  and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Obj. 3:  Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of sorrow is evil.  But contemplation can be an evil:  since the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that “it is unfitting to think of certain things.”  Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Obj. 4:  Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12, 13; x, 4.  But the work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy it altogether, or as to make it difficult.  Therefore in contemplation there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.

Obj. 5:  Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow.  But, as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) “much study is an affliction of the flesh.”  Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16):  “Her,” i.e. wisdom’s, “conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy and gladness.”  Now the conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation.  Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.