Reply Obj. 1:  Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other accidentally:  and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure.  In one way, in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something pleasant:  thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers.  In another way, in so far as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure.  In each of these ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the comfort of the future life.  Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for the delay of glory, he merits the consolation of eternity.  In like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain it.

Reply Obj. 2:  Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as it recalls a beloved object to one’s memory, and makes one feel one’s love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain.  Consequently, since love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant.  And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage:  in so far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented.

Reply Obj. 3:  The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered under the aspect of good or evil.  In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally:  that is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 4]

Whether All Sorrow Is Contrary to All Pleasure?

Objection 1:  It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure.  Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul’s passions.  But whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another.  Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.

Obj. 2:  Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil).  But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14).  Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow.

Obj. 3:  Further, contraries are hindrances to one another.  But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure:  as is evident from Ethic. x, 5.  Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.

On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries.  But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the same habit:  thus from charity it happens that we “rejoice with them that rejoice,” and “weep with them that weep” (Rom. 12:15).  Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.