Reply Obj. 1:  We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body:  as when we suffer something hurtful to the body.  But the movement of pain is always in the soul; since “the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it,” as Augustine says (Super Psalm. 87:4).

Reply Obj. 2:  We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.

Reply Obj. 3:  Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because nature desires something as good, the removal of which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 2]

Whether Sorrow Is the Same As Pain?

Objection 1:  It would seem that sorrow is not pain.  For Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei xiv, 7) that “pain is used to express bodily suffering.”  But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul.  Therefore sorrow is not pain.

Obj. 2:  Further, pain is only in respect of present evil.  But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil:  thus repentance is sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the future.  Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain.

Obj. 3:  Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch.  But sorrow can arise from all the senses.  Therefore sorrow is not pain, and extends to more objects.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2):  “I have great sorrow [Douay:  ‘sadness’] and continual pain [Douay:  ‘sorrow’] in my heart,” thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.

I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination.  Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior apprehension:  because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely.  Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is called joy, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 3):  and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow.  And just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed but not sorrow.  Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of pleasure.

Reply Obj. 1:  Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word:  because “pain” is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.

Reply Obj. 2:  External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future.  Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future:  whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can only regard something present.