Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, and unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things.  Now the greatest good of everything is its last end.  And the end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the use of that thing; thus the miser’s end is either money or the possession of money.  Accordingly, man’s last end may be said to be either God Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end.  And in this sense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods.

Reply Obj. 1:  Not every pleasure arises from a “becoming”; for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above.  Accordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, although every pleasure is not such.

Reply Obj. 2:  This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can make it better:  whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of another good.  Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.

Reply Obj. 3:  That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose in the perfect good.  Hence it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all.  Thus a certain science is supremely good, but not every science is. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 4]

Whether Pleasure Is the Measure or Rule by Which to Judge of Moral
Good or Evil?

Objection 1:  It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil.  Because “that which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest” (Metaph. x, 1).  But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire.  Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.

Obj. 2:  Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all movements (Metaph. x, 1).  But pleasures are various and multiform:  since some of them are good, and some evil.  Therefore pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals.

Obj. 3:  Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect.  Now goodness or malice of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure:  because “those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those are evil which arise from evil operations,” as stated in Ethic. x, 5.  Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice.