Reply Obj. 2:  The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason.  The fact that children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil:  because they have from God their natural appetite, which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.

Reply Obj. 3:  Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as we shall state further on (Q. 57, A. 3).  But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art.  Nevertheless there is an art of making pleasure, namely, “the art of cookery and the art of making arguments,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 2]

Whether Every Pleasure Is Good?

Objection 1:  It would seem that every pleasure is good.  Because as stated in the First Part (Q. 5, A. 6) there are three kinds of good:  the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant.  But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner everything useful is good.  Therefore also every pleasure is good.

Obj. 2:  Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6, 7.  But pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased.  Therefore pleasure is good in itself.  Now that which is predicated of a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof universally.  Therefore every pleasure is good.

Obj. 3:  Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of itself:  because good is “what all things seek,” as stated in Ethic. i, 1.  But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals.  Therefore pleasure is good in itself:  and consequently all pleasure is good.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 2:14):  “Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.”

I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and that consequently all pleasures are good.  They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual.  That which is good simply, is good in itself.  Now that which is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two ways.  In one way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural:  thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament.  In another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable.  And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply.  But if a man’s appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good.