The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.
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QUESTION 34

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures:  under which head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether every pleasure is evil?

(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?

(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?

(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 1]

Whether Every Pleasure Is Evil?

Objection 1:  It would seem that every pleasure is evil.  For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil in itself:  since man’s good is to be “in accord with reason,” as Dionysius says (Div.  Nom. iv).  But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater:  wherefore “in sexual pleasures,” which are the greatest of all, “it is impossible to understand anything,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 11.  Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that “at the time of conjugal intercourse, the presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty.”  Therefore pleasure is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is evil.

Obj. 2:  Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 “the virtuous man is a kind of measure and rule of human actions”; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15):  “The spiritual man judgeth all things.”  But children and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure:  whereas the man who is master of himself does not.  Therefore pleasures are evil in themselves and should be avoided.

Obj. 3:  Further, “virtue and art are concerned about the difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3).  But no art is ordained to pleasure.  Therefore pleasure is not something good.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4):  “Delight in the Lord.”  Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil.

I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2, 3, some have maintained that all pleasure is evil.  The reason seems to have been that they took account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3).  And they held that all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone to immoderate pleasures, arrives