Reply Obj. 1:  The objects of operations are not pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes pleasure in knowing that he has something good—­riches, honor, or the like; which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as possessed.  For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) “we take great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves.”  Now to have such like things is nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them:  and this is through some operation.  Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its cause.

Reply Obj. 2:  Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as possessed or effected:  and this implies use or operation.

Reply Obj. 3:  Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent.  Now, since human power is finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain measure.  Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome.  And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results from labor. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 2]

Whether Movement Is a Cause of Pleasure?

Objection 1:  It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure.  Because, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1), the good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure:  wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in existence.  Now that which is being moved towards something has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3.  Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Obj. 2:  Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in our works.  But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are not pleasant but disagreeable.  Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Obj. 3:  Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the opposite of custom.  But things “which we are accustomed to, are pleasant,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11).  Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3):  “What means this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee?  What means this, that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and reconciled?” From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind of alterations:  and therefore movement seems to cause pleasure.