Reply Obj. 3:  The things in which we take pleasure, since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different.  Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in acts and passions, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 4; Q. 30, A. 2). ________________________

QUESTION 32

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the causes of pleasure:  and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?

(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?

(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?

(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?

(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?

(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?

(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?

(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 1]

Whether Operation Is the Proper Cause of Pleasure?

Objection 1:  It would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure.  For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), “pleasure consists in a perception of the senses,” since knowledge is requisite for pleasure, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1).  But the objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves.  Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.

Obj. 2:  Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained:  since it is this that is chiefly desired.  But the end is not always an operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation.  Therefore operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.

Obj. 3:  Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work:  and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11).  Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, 13; x, 4) that “pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 31, A. 1), two things are requisite for pleasure:  namely, the attainment of the suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment.  Now each of these consists in a kind of operation:  because actual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation.  Moreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good.  Wherefore every pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.