Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will.  Hence Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei xiv, 6) that “desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish.”

Reply Obj. 1:  In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word “sensible” in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception.  For he says (Ethic. x, 4) that “delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation.”  Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.

Reply Obj. 2:  Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation.  It is not thus in the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement:  for thus it is also in God and the angels.  Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that “God rejoices by one simple act”:  and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel.  Hier., that “the angels are not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of incorruption.”

Reply Obj. 3:  In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels.  Wherefore Dionysius says (De Coel.  Hier.) that “holy men often take part in the angelic delights.”  Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels. ________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 5]

Whether Bodily and Sensible Pleasures Are Greater Than Spiritual and
Intellectual Pleasures?

Objection 1:  It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures.  For all men seek some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2, 4).  But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures.  Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.

Obj. 2:  Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect.  But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since “they alter the state of the body, and in some they cause madness” (Ethic. vii, 3).  Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.

Obj. 3:  Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence:  whereas there is no need to check spiritual pleasures.  Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:103):  “How sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that “the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom.”

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.