Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa.  Consequently whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings.  And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to reason.  And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy.

Reply Obj. 1:  Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to diversity of the object.  And so delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called otherwise than delights:  as we have observed above in regard to concupiscences (Q. 30, A. 3, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 2:  A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also:  so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul.  Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to the difference of movement.

Reply Obj. 3:  These other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for laetitia (gladness) is derived from the “dilation” of the heart, as if one were to say “latitia”; “exultation” is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and “cheerfulness” is so called from certain special signs and effects of gladness.  Yet all these names seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 4]

Whether Delight Is in the Intellectual Appetite?

Objection 1:  It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite.  Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that “delight is a sensible movement.”  But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power.  Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.

Obj. 2:  Further, delight is a passion.  But every passion is in the sensitive appetite.  Therefore delight is only in the sensitive appetite.

Obj. 3:  Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals.  Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we have in common with irrational animals.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4):  “Delight in the Lord.”  But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual appetite can.  Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason.  Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the will.  And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.