Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time:  for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement.  But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally:  whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally.

Reply Obj. 1:  As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold.  One is “the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such”:  this movement is successive and is in time.  Another movement is “the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act,” e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight.  This movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.

Reply Obj. 2:  Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.

Reply Obj. 3:  Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has.  Wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them than in delight.  And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 3]

Whether Delight Differs from Joy?

Objection 1:  It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy.  Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects.  But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained.  Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.

Obj. 2:  Further, one movement does not end in two terms.  But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight.  Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same.

Obj. 3:  Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul.  But this seems to be untrue.  Therefore joy does not differ from delight.

On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them.  Therefore joy is not the same as delight.

I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of delight.  For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 3), so also some delights are natural, and some are not natural but rational.  Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat.  Hom. xviii.] put it, “some delights are of the body, some are of the soul”; which amounts to the same.  For we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a result of reason.  But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight.