But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the universal in both ways.

Reply Obj. 1:  The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such:  but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is given by abstraction.

Reply Obj. 2:  That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred.  But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance with others, so as to be hateful to them.

Reply Obj. 3:  This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality:  and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension or appetite. ________________________

QUESTION 30

OF CONCUPISCENCE
(In Four Articles)

We have now to consider concupiscence:  under which head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?

(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?

(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?

(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]

Whether Concupiscence Is in the Sensitive Appetite Only?

Objection 1:  It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite.  For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according to Wis. 6:21:  “The concupiscence [Douay:  ‘desire’] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom.”  But the sensitive appetite can have no tendency to wisdom.  Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite.

Obj. 2:  Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the sensitive appetite:  in fact the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18):  “There dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good.”  But desire for God’s commandments is an act of concupiscence, according to Ps. 118:20:  “My soul hath coveted (concupivit) to long for thy justifications.”  Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite.

Obj. 3:  Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of concupiscence.  Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul, and not only in the sensitive appetite.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that “the irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided into the faculties of concupiscence and anger.  This is the irrational part of the soul, passive and appetitive.”  Therefore concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite.