In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act.  For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire.  Now man’s appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good.  And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good.  Therefore none of them can be man’s last end.

But if we speak of man’s last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end:  since man attains happiness through his soul.  Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness.  Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.

Reply Obj. 1:  Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is something outside.  And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2:  As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself.  Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases.  As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.

Reply Obj. 3:  Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above. ________________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 8]

Whether Any Created Good Constitutes Man’s Happiness?

Objection 1:  It would seem that some created good constitutes man’s happiness.  For Dionysius says (Div.  Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom “unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things,” from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature.  But man’s highest good is happiness.  Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1), it seems that man’s happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.

Obj. 2:  Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect:  hence the part is for the whole, as for its end.  But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect.  Therefore man’s happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.

Obj. 3:  Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire.  But man’s natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing his capacity.  Since then man’s capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy by some created good.  Consequently some created good constitutes man’s happiness.