Reply Obj. 2:  The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible.  And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.

Reply Obj. 3:  All desire delight in the same way as they desire good:  and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above (ad 1).  Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good. ________________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 7]

Whether Some Good of the Soul Constitutes Man’s Happiness?

Objection 1:  It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man’s happiness.  For happiness is man’s good.  Now this is threefold:  external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul.  But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above (AA. 4, 5).  Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.

Obj. 2:  Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it:  thus we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than we love money.  But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself.  Therefore he loves himself more than all other goods.  Now happiness is what is loved above all:  which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired.  Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself:  not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.

Obj. 3:  Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected.  But happiness is a perfection of man.  Therefore happiness is something belonging to man.  But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above (A. 5).  Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.

On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr.  Christ. i, 22), “that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake.”  But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God’s sake.  Therefore happiness consists in no good of the soul.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end is twofold:  namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing.  If, then, we speak of man’s last end, it is impossible for man’s last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it.  Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality:  for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous.  Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end.  Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.