Reply Obj. 2:  Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good thing to acknowledge one’s faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or hypocrisy.

Reply Obj. 3:  The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only.  For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known.  Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds.  But in reference to the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression “beautiful,” for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors.  Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty:  so that “good” means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the “beautiful” is something pleasant to apprehend. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 2]

Whether Knowledge Is a Cause of Love?

Objection 1:  It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love.  For it is due to love that a thing is sought.  But some things are sought without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since “to have them is the same as to know them,” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them.  Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.

Obj. 2:  Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something more than we know it.  But some things are loved more than they are known:  thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in Himself.  Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.

Obj. 3:  Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be no love, where there is no knowledge.  But in all things there is love, as Dionysius says (Div.  Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all things.  Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.

On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1, 2) that “none can love what he does not know.”

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), good is the cause of love, as being its object.  But good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended.  And therefore love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved.  For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5, 12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love:  and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love.  Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.

Reply Obj. 1:  He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge thereof:  but knows something about it already in some respect, either in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1, 2).  But to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.