Reply Obj. 1:  Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence.  For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good:  while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.

Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3:  When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good:  and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved.  But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship. ________________________

QUESTION 27

OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the cause of love:  and under this head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?

(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?

(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?

(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 1]

Whether Good Is the Only Cause of Love?

Objection 1:  It would seem that good is not the only cause of love.  For good does not cause love, except because it is loved.  But it happens that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6:  “He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul”:  else, every love would be good.  Therefore good is not the only cause of love.

Obj. 2:  Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “we love those who acknowledge their evils.”  Therefore it seems that evil is the cause of love.

Obj. 3:  Further, Dionysius says (Div.  Nom. iv) that not “the good” only but also “the beautiful is beloved by all.”

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3):  “Assuredly the good alone is beloved.”  Therefore good alone is the cause of love.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 26, A. 1), Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty.  Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act.  Therefore the cause of love must needs be love’s object.  Now the proper object of love is the good; because, as stated above (Q. 26, AA. 1, 2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it.  It follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.

Reply Obj. 1:  Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered as being good simply.  And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good.  It is in this way that man “loves iniquity,” inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or such like.