disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it.  And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.  Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure.  But in the order of intention, it is the reverse:  because the pleasure intended causes desire and love.  For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 3, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 1:  We name a thing as we understand it, for “words are signs of thoughts,” as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1).  Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect.  But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure:  when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence:  and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), “we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love.”  Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.

Reply Obj. 2:  The union of lover and beloved is twofold.  There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other.  This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire.  There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it:  and love betokens such a union.  This union precedes the movement of desire.

Reply Obj. 3:  Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 3]

Whether Hope Is the First of the Irascible Passions?

Objection 1:  It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions.  Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger.  Since, therefore, “things are names from their chief characteristic” (cf.  A. 2, Obj. 1), it seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope.

Obj. 2:  Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous.  Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive simply to obtain some good.  Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil.  Therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope.  And consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.

Obj. 3:  Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach.  But fear and despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something.  Therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring.