I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts (Q. 18, AA. 5, 6; Q. 20, A. 1)—­viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view.  First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion.  Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason.  In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason:  as is clear in the case of shame which is base fear; and of envy which is sorrow for another’s good:  for thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.

Reply Obj. 1:  This argument considers the passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself.  But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.

Reply Obj. 2:  Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil.  On the other hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to evil, are themselves evil.

Reply Obj. 3:  In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason.  Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul’s passions. ________________________

QUESTION 25

OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the order of the passions to one another:  and under this head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions;

(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;

(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;

(4) The four principal passions.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]

Whether the Irascible Passions Precede the Concupiscible Passions, or
Vice Versa?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions.  For the order of the passions is that of their objects.  But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good.  Therefore the irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions.

Obj. 2:  Further, the mover precedes that which is moved.  But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that which is moved:  since it is given to animals, for the purpose of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1; I, Q. 81, A. 2).  Now “that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover” (Phys. viii, 4).  Therefore the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions.