Reply Obj. 1:  The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason.  First, antecedently:  and thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity.  In the second place, consequently:  and this in two ways.  First, by way of redundance:  because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement:  and thus the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness.  Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite.  And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.

Reply Obj. 2:  In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members:  and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.

Reply Obj. 3:  A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above (Reply Obj. 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 4]

Whether Any Passion Is Good or Evil in Its Species?

Objection 1:  It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species.  Because moral good and evil depend on reason.  But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them.  Since, therefore, nothing accidental belongs to a thing’s species, it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species.

Obj. 2:  Further, acts and passions take their species from their object.  If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy:  and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness.  But this is clearly false.  Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species.

Obj. 3:  Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals.  But moral good is in man alone.  Therefore no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei ix, 5) that “pity is a kind of virtue.”  Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion.  Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species.