Reply Obj. 1:  Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself.  And therefore it is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by “riches,” just as the good of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.

Reply Obj. 2:  Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes all these.  And in this sense Dionysius speaks.  But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent.  Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than living things.

Reply Obj. 3:  Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom every perfection of being is:  Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy.  And this belongs to few. ________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]

Whether Man’s Happiness Consists in Pleasure?

Objection 1:  It would seem that man’s happiness consists in pleasure.  For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else, but other things for it.  But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else:  “for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased” (Ethic. x, 2).  Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.

Obj. 2:  Further, “the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause” (De Causis i).  Now the causality of the end consists in its attracting the appetite.  Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end.  Now this is pleasure:  and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man’s will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods.  Therefore it seems that man’s last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.

Obj. 3:  Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best.  But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures.  Therefore delight is the best of all.  Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii):  “Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending:  and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too.”