On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.  And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have hope and despair. In respect of evil not yet present we have fear and daring. But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion:  because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above (A. 3).  But evil already present gives rise to the passion of anger.

Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness.  In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has no contrary passion.

Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.

From this the replies to the objections are evident.
________________________

QUESTION 24

OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul:  and under this head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?

(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?

(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?

(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 1]

Whether Moral Good and Evil Can Be Found in the Passions of the Soul?

Objection 1:  It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.  For moral good and evil are proper to man:  since “morals are properly predicated of man,” as Ambrose says (Super Luc.  Prolog.).  But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other animals.  Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.

Obj. 2:  Further, the good or evil of man consists in “being in accord, or in disaccord with reason,” as Dionysius says (Div.  Nom. iv).  Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3).  Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.

Obj. 3:  Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that “we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions.”  But we are praised and blamed for moral good and evil.  Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul:  “They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good.”