Obj. 3:  Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above (A. 2).  But every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa.  Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.

On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul.  But no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5.  Therefore not every passion has a contrary.

I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the contrariety of good and evil.  For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present:  and when such an evil is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of sadness, which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of anger. But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal:  because the evil is supposed to be already present or past.  Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.

In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil.  Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty.  Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement, except the appetite’s repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.

Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “calm is contrary to anger,” by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.

From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]

Whether in the Same Power, There Are Any Passions, Specifically
Different, but Not Contrary to One Another?

Objection 1:  It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.  For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects.  Now the objects of the soul’s passions are good and evil; and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions.  Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ specifically.

Obj. 2:  Further, difference of species implies a difference of form.  But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as stated in Metaph. x, 8.  Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.