Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul:  one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term.  In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects:  whereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety.  The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (A. 1), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely.  Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it.  In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it:  wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom.  Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow.  Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.

On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty or arduousness.  Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of hope; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of despair. In like manner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of fear: but it also contains a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called daring. Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope and fear):  and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).

From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 3]

Whether Any Passion of the Soul Has No Contrary?

Objection 1:  It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary.  For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (A. 1).  But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety.  Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary.

Obj. 2:  Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive part.  But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object.  Therefore every passion has a contrary.