Reply Obj. 1:  By “suffering” Divine things is meant being well affected towards them, and united to them by love:  and this takes place without any alteration in the body.

Reply Obj. 2:  Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient:  because things that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents.  Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more passive.

Reply Obj. 3:  When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion.  Hence Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei ix, 5):  “The holy angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy:  and yet ordinary human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours.” ________________________

QUESTION 23

HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider how the passions differ from one another:  and under this head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?

(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil?

(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?

(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another? ________________________

QUESTION 23

Whether the Passions of the Concupiscible Part Are Different from Those of the Irascible Part?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts.  For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that the passions of the soul are those emotions “which are followed by joy or sorrow.”  But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part.  Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible part.

Obj. 2:  Further, on the words of Matt. 13:33, “The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven,” etc., Jerome’s gloss says:  “We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part.”  But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7.  Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and irascible faculties.

Obj. 3:  Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects.  But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil.  Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.