Reply Obj. 1:  It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose something and to be transmuted:  hence this happens only in those things that are composed of matter and form.  But passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in potentiality.  Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive, according as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.

Reply Obj. 2:  Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in De Anima i, 3.

Reply Obj. 3:  This argument is true of passion accompanied by transmutation to something worse.  And passion, in this sense, is not found in the soul, except accidentally:  but the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 2]

Whether Passion Is in the Appetitive Rather Than in the Apprehensive
Part?

Objection 1:  It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive.  Because that which is first in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1.  Now passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part:  for the appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous passion in the apprehensive part.  Therefore passion is in the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.

Obj. 2:  Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is contrary to passion.  Now the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part.  Therefore it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part.

Obj. 3:  Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension.  But passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation.  Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei ix, 4) that “the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called pathe, are styled by some of our writers, Cicero ["Those things which the Greeks call _pathe_, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases” (Tusc. iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call them passions.”  From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as affections.  But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part.  Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part.