thereby.  But this sin is not proper to the artist as such, but as man.  Consequently for the former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is blamed as a man.  On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of reason to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of reason to the general end of human life.  Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being.  Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues,” which prudence directs, “he is the reverse.”

Reply Obj. 3:  Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to man’s power:  wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 3]

Whether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious in So Far As
It Is Good or Evil?

Objection 1:  It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice.  For we speak of merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in matters relating to another person.  But good or evil actions are not all related to another person, for some are related to the person of the agent.  Therefore not every good or evil human action is meritorious or demeritorious.

Obj. 2:  Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he chooses with that of which he is master:  thus if a man destroys what belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs to another.  But man is master of his own actions.  Therefore a man does not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action to a good or evil purpose.

Obj. 3:  Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man:  and the same applies to evil.  Now a good action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the agent:  while an inordinate action is his evil.  Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a good or an evil deed.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. 3:10, 11):  “Say to the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings.  Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him.”

I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice.  Now, retribution according to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to another’s advantage or hurt.  It must, moreover, be observed that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole society.  Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society:  thus, who hurts the hand, hurts the man.  When, therefore, anyone does good or evil