Reply Obj. 1:  This continual movement which proceeds from various intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one in the point of moral unity.

Reply Obj. 2:  Action and passion belong to the moral order, in so far as they are voluntary.  And therefore in so far as they are voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.

Reply Obj. 3:  The action of the servant, in so far as it proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the master’s action:  but only in so far as it proceeds from the master’s command.  Wherefore the evil will of the servant does not make the action evil in this respect. ________________________

QUESTION 21

OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE (In Four Articles)

We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and malice:  and under this head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil?

(2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?

(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?

(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 1]

Whether a Human Action Is Right or Sinful, in So Far As It Is Good or
Evil?

Objection 1:  It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil.  For “monsters are the sins of nature” (Phys. ii, 8).  But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the order of nature.  Now things that are produced according to art and reason imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys. ii, 8).  Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being inordinate and evil.

Obj. 2:  Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in nature and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained.  But the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the intention of the end, and on its achievement.  Therefore it seems that the malice of an action does not make it sinful.

Obj. 3:  Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin.  But this is false:  since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil.  Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.

On the contrary, As shown above (Q. 19, A. 4), the goodness of a human action depends principally on the Eternal Law:  and consequently its malice consists in its being in disaccord with the Eternal Law.  But this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that “sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal Law.”  Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.