Reply Obj. 2:  As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral virtue is ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were, of that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained to things directed to the end.  For this reason various virtues are necessary.  But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.

Reply Obj. 3:  When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both:  thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same specifically.  But when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in both:  thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from the healthiness of the animal’s body; nor is health as applied to urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the body of an animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign.  It is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order of one to the other. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 4]

Whether the External Action Adds Any Goodness or Malice to That of the Interior Act?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the external action does not add any goodness or malice to that of the interior action.  For Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matt.):  “It is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or punished for doing evil.”  Now works are the witnesses of the will.  Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order to know how to judge; but for the sake of others, that all may understand how just He is.  But good or evil is to be estimated according to God’s judgment rather than according to the judgment of man.  Therefore the external action adds no goodness or malice to that of the interior act.

Obj. 2:  Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and external acts are one and the same, as stated above (A. 3).  But increase is the addition of one thing to another.  Therefore the external action does not add to the goodness or malice of the interior act.

Obj. 3:  Further, the entire goodness of created things does not add to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom.  But sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).  Therefore neither of them adds to the goodness or malice of the other.

On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil.  If therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed.  Which is unreasonable.