Obj. 3:  Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to the external action, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 6).  But that which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter.  Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that “it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright.”  Therefore moral good and evil are first in the will.

I answer that, External actions may be said to be good or bad in two ways.  First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected with them:  thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said to be good.  Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, from its relation to the end:  thus the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil.  Now, since the end is the will’s proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the external action.  On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external action has of itself, on account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, but rather from the reason.  Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes from reason’s ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will:  but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.

Reply Obj. 1:  The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and ordained by the reason:  and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will.  But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.

Reply Obj. 2:  The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows in the order of execution.

Reply Obj. 3:  A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order of nature:  but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way.  Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its efficient cause.  Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 2]

Whether the Whole Goodness and Malice of the External Action Depends on the Goodness of the Will?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will.  For it is written (Matt. 7:18):  “A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.”  But, according to the gloss, the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works.  Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the external action evil, or vice versa.