Reply Obj. 2:  God does not will the damnation of a man, considered precisely as damnation, nor a man’s death, considered precisely as death, because, “He wills all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice.  Wherefore in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of God’s justice and of the natural order.

Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.

To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said that a man who conforms his will to God’s, in the aspect of reason of the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who conforms his will to God’s, in the point of the very thing willed; because the will tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the end.

To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the object considered materially.

To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when several people desire different things, but not under the same aspect:  but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect, one man wills a thing which another wills not.  But there is no question of this here. ________________________

QUESTION 20

OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTIONS
(In Six Articles)

We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions:  under which head there are six points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in the external action?

(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?

(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action?

(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?

(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?

(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 1]

Whether Goodness or Malice Is First in the Action of the Will, or in the External Action?

Objection 1:  It would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior to being in the act of the will.  For the will derives goodness from its object, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 1, 2).  But the external action is the object of the interior act of the will:  for a man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms.  Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.

Obj. 2:  Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end:  since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its relation to the end.  Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2), the act of another power can be an end.  Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act of the will.