On the other hand, the apprehension of a creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature.  Now a thing may happen to be good under a particular aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above.  And therefore it comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something considered under a particular aspect, which thing God wills not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa.  And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or not to be.

But a man’s will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end:  since even the natural appetite of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole.  Now it is the end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end.  Consequently, in order that a man will some particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally.  Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the reason given above.

At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to the Divine, in a certain degree.  Because inasmuch as it is conformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed thereto in the point of the last end.  While, inasmuch as it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it is conformed to that will considered as efficient cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its efficient cause.  Hence it is customary to say that a man’s will, in this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what God wishes him to will.

There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause, consisting in man’s willing something from charity, as God wills it.  And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is the proper object of charity.

Reply Obj. 1:  We can know in a general way what God wills.  For we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good.  Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed.  But we know not what God wills in particular:  and in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.

But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that particular matter.  Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not only formally, but also materially.