Obj. 2:  Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about to die in mortal sin.  If therefore man were bound to conform his will to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow that a man is bound to will his own damnation.  Which is inadmissible.

Obj. 3:  Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial piety.  But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes be contrary to filial piety:  for instance, when God wills the death of a father:  if his son were to will it also, it would be against filial piety.  Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed.

On the contrary, (1) On Ps. 32:1, “Praise becometh the upright,” a gloss says:  “That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills.”  But everyone is bound to have an upright heart.  Therefore everyone is bound to will what God wills.

(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every act.  If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.

(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different things.  But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has an evil will.  Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.

I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above (AA. 3, 5), the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the reason.  Now a thing may be considered in various ways by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not good from another point of view.  And therefore if a man’s will wills a thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good:  and the will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as it appears evil, is also good.  Thus a judge has a good will, in willing a thief to be put to death, because this is just:  while the will of another—­e.g. the thief’s wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, is also good.

Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the more universal the good to which the will tends.  This is evident in the example given above:  because the judge has care of the common good, which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief’s death, which has the aspect of good in relation to the common estate; whereas the thief’s wife has to consider the private good of the family, and from this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be put to death.  Now the good of the whole universe is that which is apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things:  hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe.