Reply Obj. 3:  As we have already stated (A. 6, ad 1), “evil results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause.”  Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil, it will be evil in either case.  But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words, it must will the good for the sake of the good. ________________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 8]

Whether the Degree of Goodness or Malice in the Will Depends on the
Degree of Good or Evil in the Intention?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will depends on the degree of good in the intention.  Because on Matt. 12:35, “A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good,” a gloss says:  “A man does as much good as he intends.”  But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated above (A. 7).  Therefore the goodness of a man’s will is according to the goodness of his intention.

Obj. 2:  Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect.  But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.  Therefore a man’s will is good, according as his intention is good.

Obj. 3:  Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his intention:  for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous intention, he would be guilty of murder.  Therefore, for the same reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good intended.

On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the will is evil.  Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the will less good.

I answer that, In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end, we may consider a twofold quantity:  one, on the part of the object, by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.

If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does not depend on the quantity in the intention.  With regard to the external act this may happen in two ways.  First, through the object that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds.  Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to remove:  for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which prevent him from going.  On the other hand, with regard to the interior act of the will, this happens in only one way:  because the