Reply Obj. 1:  Although the judgment of an erring reason is not derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is all truth.

Reply Obj. 2:  The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the command of the higher authority.  But if a man were to believe the command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor.  In like manner if a man were to know that human reason was dictating something contrary to God’s commandment, he would not be bound to abide by reason:  but then reason would not be entirely erroneous.  But when erring reason proposes something as being commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God.

Reply Obj. 3:  Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being something contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for some such like reason.  And then that evil is reduced to that species of malice. ________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]

Whether the Will Is Good When It Abides by Erring Reason?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the will is good when it abides by erring reason.  For just as the will, when at variance with the reason, tends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with reason, it tends to what reason judges to be good.  But the will is evil when it is at variance with reason, even when erring.  Therefore even when it abides by erring reason, the will is good.

Obj. 2:  Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the commandment of God and the eternal law.  But the eternal law and God’s commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even when it errs.  Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by erring reason.

Obj. 3:  Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason.  If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason:  so that in such a case a man would be in a dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin:  which is unreasonable.  Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring reason.

On the contrary, The will of those who slew the apostles was evil.  And yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to John 16:2:  “The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God.”  Therefore the will can be evil, when it abides by erring reason.