Reply Obj. 2:  A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing measured; a remote measure is not.

Reply Obj. 3:  Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind:  nevertheless, it becomes known to us somewhat, either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation. ________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 5]

Whether the Will Is Evil When It Is at Variance with Erring Reason?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason.  Because the reason is the rule of the human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as stated above (A. 4).  But erring reason is not derived from the eternal law.  Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human will.  Therefore the will is not evil, if it be at variance with erring reason.

Obj. 2:  Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority:  for instance, if a provincial governor command something that is forbidden by the emperor.  But erring reason sometimes proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power is supreme.  Therefore the decision of an erring reason does not bind.  Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance with erring reason.

Obj. 3:  Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of malice.  But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not reducible to some species of malice.  For instance, if a man’s reason err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to do so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice.  Therefore the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason.

On the contrary, As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 13), conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action.  Now knowledge is in the reason.  Therefore when the will is at variance with erring reason, it is against conscience.  But every such will is evil; for it is written (Rom. 14:23):  “All that is not of faith”—­i.e. all that is against conscience—­“is sin.”  Therefore the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason.

I answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason, for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the First Part (Q. 19, A. 13), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire “whether an erring conscience binds.”  On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions:  for some are good generically; some are indifferent; some are evil generically.  And they say that if reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good generically, there is no error:  and in like manner if it tell us not to do something which is evil generically; since it