Reply Obj. 1:  The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible, pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason.  But considered as true it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of goodness, pertaining to the will:  because the will cannot desire a good that is not previously apprehended by reason.

Reply Obj. 2:  The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means:  for in this respect it is perfected by prudence.  Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end:  nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of reason a right apprehension of the end.

Reply Obj. 3:  The will moves the reason in one way:  the reason moves the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 4]

Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on the Eternal Law?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on the eternal law.  Because to one thing there is one rule and one measure.  But the rule of the human will, on which its goodness depends, is right reason.  Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the eternal law.

Obj. 2:  Further, “a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured” (Metaph. x, 1).  But the eternal law is not homogeneous with the human will.  Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the goodness of the human will depends.

Obj. 3:  Further, a measure should be most certain.  But the eternal law is unknown to us.  Therefore it cannot be the measure on which the goodness of our will depends.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that “sin is a deed, word or desire against the eternal law.”  But malice of the will is the root of sin.  Therefore, since malice is contrary to goodness, the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.

I answer that, Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause:  since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first.  Now it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that human reason is the rule of the human will, from which the human derives its goodness.  Hence it is written (Ps. 4:6, 7):  “Many say:  Who showeth us good things?  The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”:  as though to say:  “The light of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide our will, in so far as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance.”  It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much more than on human reason:  and when human reason fails we must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.

Reply Obj. 1:  To one thing there are not several proximate measures; but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other.