Reply Obj. 2:  Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that act bad.  Consequently when it is said that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, this can be understood in two ways.  First, so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed.  And thus the act of the will is not fixed on something good:  since to will to do something when it ought not to be done, is not to will something good.  Secondly, so that the circumstance is referred to the act of willing.  And thus, it is impossible to will something good when one ought not to, because one ought always to will what is good:  except, perhaps, accidentally, in so far as a man by willing some particular good, is prevented from willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that time.  And then evil results, not from his willing that particular good, but from his not willing the other.  The same applies to the other circumstances.

Reply Obj. 3:  Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed:  that is to say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 3]

Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on Reason?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.  For what comes first does not depend on what follows.  But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 9, A. 1).  Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.

Obj. 2:  Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the goodness of the practical intellect is “a truth that is in conformity with right desire.”  But right desire is a good will.  Therefore the goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness of the will, rather than conversely.

Obj. 3:  Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved, but vice versa.  But the will moves the reason and the other powers, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1).  Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. x):  “It is an unruly will that persists in its desires in opposition to reason.”  But the goodness of the will consists in not being unruly.  Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the goodness of the will depends properly on the object.  Now the will’s object is proposed to it by reason.  Because the good understood is the proportionate object of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will but to the sensitive appetite:  since the will can tend to the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive appetite tends only to the particular good, apprehended by the sensitive power.  Therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends on the object.