I answer that, As stated above (A. 10), a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a special order of reason.  Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil.  Thus to take something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be presupposed, from which the action takes its malice or goodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant with reason.  Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin.  Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin.  The same applies to other evil or good actions.  Consequently not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species.

Reply Obj. 1:  In things which can be more or less intense, the difference of more or less does not change the species:  thus by differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to its species of color.  In like manner that which makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make the action differ in species.

Reply Obj. 2:  A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself, but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above.  Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action.

Reply Obj. 3:  A circumstance does not always involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to something else.  In like manner a circumstance does not always add further perfection, except in reference to something else.  And, for as much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always change the species of good or evil. ________________________

QUESTION 19

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (In Ten Articles)

We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; under which head there are ten points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?

(2) Whether it depends on the object alone?

(3) Whether it depends on reason?

(4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?

(5) Whether erring reason binds?

(6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God?

(7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on the intention of the end?

(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?