Reply Obj. 1:  Privation is twofold.  One is privation “as a result” (privatum esse), and this leaves nothing, but takes all away:  thus blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life.  Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be no medium in respect of the proper subject.  The other is privation “in process” (privari):  thus sickness is privation of health; not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of health, occasioned by death.  And since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary of the opposite habit.  In this way evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories:  because it does not take away all good, but leaves some.  Consequently there can be something between good and evil.

Reply Obj. 2:  Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least natural to it:  but this does not imply moral goodness or malice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated above.  And it is of this that we are here treating.

Reply Obj. 3:  Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to its species.  Wherefore although an action’s specific nature may not contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it specifically good.  Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked. ________________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 9]

Whether an Individual Action Can Be Indifferent?

Objection 1:  It would seem that an individual action can be indifferent.  For there is no species that does not, or cannot, contain an individual.  But an action can be indifferent in its species, as stated above (A. 8).  Therefore an individual action can be indifferent.

Obj. 2:  Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1.  But a habit can be indifferent:  for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not good, since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect of a habit.  Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.

Obj. 3:  Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil belongs to vice.  But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end.  Therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent.

On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.):  “An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of just necessity or pious utility.”  But an idle word is an evil, because “men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of judgment” (Matt. 12:36):  while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good.  Therefore every word is either good or bad.  For the same reason every other action is either good or bad.  Therefore no individual action is indifferent.