It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two ways:  first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual.  For since the end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), signifies sometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing (thus the miser’s end is either money or the possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing itself; for the possession of money is good only inasmuch as there is some good in money.  But in regard to the individual, the obtaining of money is the last end; for the miser would not seek for money, save that he might have it.  Therefore, simply and properly speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places his last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he is said to use it.

Reply Obj. 1:  Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man seeks in that end.

Reply Obj. 2:  The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that the will may find rest in it.  Consequently this rest in the end, which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end.  But the means are applied to the will’s purpose, not only in being used as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest.

Reply Obj. 3:  The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable to rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may be said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated above.  Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that “this love, delight, felicity, or happiness, is called use by him.” ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 4]

Whether Use Precedes Choice?

Objection 1:  It would seem that use precedes choice.  For nothing follows after choice, except execution.  But use, since it belongs to the will, precedes execution.  Therefore it precedes choice also.

Obj. 2:  Further, the absolute precedes the relative.  Therefore the less relative precedes the more relative.  But choice implies two relations:  one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the other, of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it is preferred; whereas use implies relation to the end only.  Therefore use precedes choice.

Obj. 3:  Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it removes them.  But the will moves itself, too, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 3).  Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to act.  But it does this when it consents.  Therefore there is use in consent.  But consent precedes choice as stated above (Q. 15, A. 3, ad 3).  Therefore use does also.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “the will after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards it uses (the powers).”  Therefore use follows choice.