I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision has not been given.  Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher reason to judge of all:  since it is by the reason that we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human principles we judge according to Divine principles, which is the function of the higher reason.  Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine principles, no judgment of the reason can be considered in the light of a final decision.  Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act.  Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in which the reason includes the will, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 1:  Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower reason it belongs to think.  Nevertheless the higher reason exercises judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action; and in like manner on the delight that results.  But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it belongs to the lower reason.  For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is ordained:  hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the master or principal art.

Reply Obj. 2:  Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of each power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.

Reply Obj. 3:  The higher reason is said to consent not only because it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but also because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons. ________________________

QUESTION 16

OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (In Four Articles)

We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether use is an act of the will?

(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?

(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?

(4) Of the relation of use to choice.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 1]

Whether Use Is an Act of the Will?

Objection 1:  It would seem that use is not an act of the will.  For Augustine says (De Doctr.  Christ. i, 4) that “to use is to refer that which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else.”  But “to refer” something to another is an act of the reason to which it belongs to compare and to direct.  Therefore use is an act of the reason and not of the will.