movement is applied to the judgment resulting from counsel.  But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to counsel:  rather is counsel applied to it, because counsel presupposes the desire of the end.  On the other hand, the desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel.  And therefore the application of the appetitive movement to counsel’s decision is consent, properly speaking.  Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.

Reply Obj. 1:  Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.

Reply Obj. 2:  Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he consents to that act.

Reply Obj. 3:  Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred:  and therefore after consent there still remains a choice.  For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each:  but after approving of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it.  But if only one meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 4]

Whether Consent to the Act Belongs Only to the Higher Part of the
Soul?

Objection 1:  It would seem that consent to the act does not always belong to the higher reason.  For “delight follows action, and perfects it, just as beauty perfects youth” [*_oion tois akmaiois he hora_—­as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4).  But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).  Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the higher reason.

Obj. 2:  Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary.  But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts.  Therefore the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.

Obj. 3:  Further, “the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7).  But man often consents to an act not for eternal, but for temporal reasons, or even on account of some passion of the soul.  Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason alone.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12):  “It is impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that mental faculty which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its slave.”