Reply Obj. 1:  Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.

Reply Obj. 2:  Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is not always at hand.  Consequently it is not always necessary to take counsel about removing the obstacle.

Reply Obj. 3:  In contingent singulars, something may be taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it concerns the work to be done.  Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues to sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact. ________________________

QUESTION 15

OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (In Four Articles)

We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?

(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?

(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?

(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 1]

Whether Consent Is an Act of the Appetitive or of the Apprehensive
Power?

Objection 1:  It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul.  For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent to the higher reason.  But the reason is an apprehensive power.  Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.

Obj. 2:  Further, consent is “co-sense.”  But sense is an apprehensive power.  Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.

Obj. 3:  Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect to something, so is consent.  But assent belongs to the intellect, which is an apprehensive power.  Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “if a man judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no sentence,” i.e. consent.  But affection belongs to the appetitive power.  Therefore consent does also.

I answer that, Consent implies application of sense to something.  Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while the intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent.  And since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, in so far as it takes complacency in it.  Hence it is written (Wis. 1:1):  “Think of (Sentite) the Lord in goodness.”  And on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.