of nature and of art.  Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end.  Secondly, because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements.  Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover.  Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.

Reply Obj. 1:  Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford him pleasure or relaxation.  But man’s consummate good is his last end.

Reply Obj. 2:  The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist’s good, included in complete and perfect good, which is the ultimate end.

Reply Obj. 3:  One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something:  but the virtue of the first intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one’s thoughts be not actually directed to the last end.  Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step. ________________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 7]

Whether All Men Have the Same Last End?

Objection 1:  It would seem that all men have not the same last end.  For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man.  But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning.  Therefore all men have not the same last end.

Obj. 2:  Further, man’s entire life is ruled according to his last end.  If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have various pursuits in life.  Which is evidently false.

Obj. 3:  Further, the end is the term of action.  But actions are of individuals.  Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals.  Therefore all men have not the same last end.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.

I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways:  first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing in which the aspect of last end is realized.  So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end:  since all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above (A. 5).  But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end:  since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else.  Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar.  Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure.  In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last end.