On the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power; which according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to opposites.

I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity.  And this is because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity.  Now the reason why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in man.  For man can will and not will, act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or that.  The reason of this is seated in the very power of the reason.  For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good.  Now the reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. “to will” or “to act,” but also this, viz. “not to will” or “not to act.”  Again, in all particular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect of evil:  and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided.  The perfect good alone, which is Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way.  Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy.  Now since choice is not of the end, but of the means, as stated above (A. 3); it is not of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular goods.  Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely.

Reply Obj. 1:  The conclusion does not always of necessity follow from the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true if the conclusion is not true.  In like manner, the end does not always necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the means are not always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be such, they are not always considered in that light.

Reply Obj. 2:  The reason’s decision or judgment of what is to be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us.  In such matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally; as, for instance, “If he runs, he is in motion.”

Reply Obj. 3:  If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other. ________________________

QUESTION 14

OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?

(2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?

(3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?

(4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?

(5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?