Reply Obj. 1:  The will stands between the intellect and the external action:  for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the will causes the external action.  Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something under the universal notion of good:  but the term or perfection of the will’s act is to be observed in its relation to the action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing.  Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one to do.  Now this cannot be something impossible.  Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for him that wills.  But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the impossible; and by some is called “velleity,” because, to wit, one would will (vellet) such a thing, were it possible.  But choice is an act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser.  And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.

Reply Obj. 2:  Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended.  And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible to him.

Reply Obj. 3:  The reason for this is that the subject should not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible; but in each case should stand by his superior’s judgment. ________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 6]

Whether Man Chooses of Necessity or Freely?

Objection 1:  It would seem that man chooses of necessity.  For the end stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that which follows from the principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8.  But conclusions follow of necessity from their principles.  Therefore man is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the means).

Obj. 2:  Further, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2), choice follows the reason’s judgment of what is to be done.  But reason judges of necessity about some things:  on account of the necessity of the premises.  Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity.

Obj. 3:  Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato says (Cf.  De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world.  Now, if that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible).  Therefore if two or more things are available, of which one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others.  Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is chosen of necessity.  But every act of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way better.  Therefore every choice is made necessarily.