Reply Obj. 2:  In contemplation itself there is the act of the intellect assenting to this or that opinion.  It is exterior action that is put in contradistinction to contemplation.

Reply Obj. 3:  When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or some high position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that post.  Else, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop or official, he would have no right to choose.  Likewise, whenever we speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in conjunction with some action of the chooser. ________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 5]

Whether Choice Is Only of Possible Things?

Objection 1:  It would seem that choice is not only of possible things.  For choice is an act of the will, as stated above (A. 1).  Now there is “a willing of impossibilities” (Ethic. iii, 2).  Therefore there is also a choice of impossibilities.

Obj. 2:  Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above (A. 4).  Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing is concerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself, or that which is impossible to the chooser.  Now it often happens that we are unable to accomplish what we choose:  so that this proves to be impossible to us.  Therefore choice is of the impossible.

Obj. 3:  Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it.  But the Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command what is impossible, it should be attempted.  Therefore choice can be of the impossible.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that “there is no choice of impossibilities.”

I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), our choice is always concerned with our actions.  Now whatever is done by us, is possible to us.  Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things.

Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an end.  But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end.  A sign of this is that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is impossible to them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the business.

Again, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the reason.  For the means, which are the object of choice, are to the end, as the conclusion is to the principle.  Now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle.  Wherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible.  Now no one is moved to the impossible.  Consequently no one would tend to the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible.  Therefore the impossible is not the object of choice.