Reply Obj. 3:  In speaking “of ignorance of choice,” we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what ought to be chosen. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 2]

Whether Choice Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals?

Objection 1:  It would seem that irrational animals are able to choose.  For choice “is the desire of certain things on account of an end,” as stated in Ethic. iii, 2, 3.  But irrational animals desire something on account of an end:  since they act for an end, and from desire.  Therefore choice is in irrational animals.

Obj. 2:  Further, the very word electio (choice) seems to signify the taking of something in preference to others.  But irrational animals take something in preference to others:  thus we can easily see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another.  Therefore choice is in irrational animals.

Obj. 3:  Further, according to Ethic. vi, 12, “it is from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means.”  But prudence is found in irrational animals:  hence it is said in the beginning of Metaph. i, 1 that “those animals which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are prudent by instinct.”  We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees, spiders, and dogs.  For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the second road:  and if he find that the stag has not passed there, being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent; as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the stag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the others, and there is no other road.  Therefore it seems that irrational animals are able to choose.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat.  Hom. xxxiii.] says that “children and irrational animals act willingly but not from choice.”  Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.

I answer that, Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that can be chosen.  Consequently in those things which are altogether determinate to one there is no place for choice.  Now the difference between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods.  Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have.  Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.

Reply Obj. 1:  Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is called choice:  there must be a certain discrimination of one thing from another.  And this cannot be except when the appetite can be moved to several things.