But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus also a man can intend several things at the same time.  This is evident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the better of the two.  Now one of the reasons for which one thing is better than another is that it is available for more purposes:  wherefore one thing can be chosen in preference to another, because of the greater number of purposes for which it is available:  so that evidently a man can intend several things at the same time.

Reply Obj. 1:  Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last ends:  since, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5), one man cannot have several last ends.

Reply Obj. 2:  There can be several termini ordained to one another, of the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless they be ordained to one another.  At the same time it must be observed that what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason.  Now intention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by the reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3).  Wherefore where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, in so far as the reason takes them as one:  either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole, as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health; or because two things are included in one which may be intended.  For instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth, as in something common to both; wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others.

Reply Obj. 3:  As stated in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 10; Q. 58, A. 2; Q. 85, A. 4), it is possible to understand several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way, they are one. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 4]

Whether Intention of the End Is the Same Act As the Volition of the
Means?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the intention of the end and the volition of the means are not one and the same movement.  For Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 6) that “the will to see the window, has for its end the seeing of the window; and is another act from the will to see, through the window, the passersby.”  But that I should will to see the passersby, through the window, belongs to intention; whereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the volition of the means.  Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.

Obj. 2:  Further, acts are distinct according to their objects.  But the end and the means are distinct objects.  Therefore the intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.

Obj. 3:  Further, the willing of the means is called choice.  But choice and intention are not the same.  Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will.