the first Parliament shou’d (as the Case now stands) engross to themselves all the Power of giving, as well as all the Merit and Rewards due to such a Gift:  and why succeeding Parliaments shou’d not, in their turn, have it in their Power to oblige the Prince, or to streighten him, if they saw Occasion; and pare his Nails, if they were convinced he made ill Use of such a Revenue.  I am sure we have had Instances of this Kind; and a wise Body of Senators ought always to provide against the worst that might happen.  The Honey-Moon of Government is a dangerous Season; the Rights and Liberties of the People run a greater Risk at that time, thro their own Representatives Compliments and Compliances, than they are ever likely to do during that Reign:  and ’tis safer to break this Practice, when we have the Prospect of a good and gracious Prince upon the Throne, than when we have an inflexible Person, who thinks every Offer an Affront, which comes not up to the Height of what his Predecessor had, without considering whether it were well or ill done at first.

The Revenues of our Kings, for many Ages, arose out of their Crown-Lands; Taxes on the Subject were raised only for publick Exigencies.  But since we have turn’d the Stream, and been so free of Revenues for Life, arising from Impositions and Taxes, we have given Occasion to our Princes to dispose of their Crown-Lands; and depend for Maintenance of their Families on such a Sort of Income, as is thought unjust and ungodly in most Parts of the World, but in Christendom:  for many of the arbitrary Eastern Monarchs think so, and will not eat the Produce of such a Revenue.  Now since Matters are brought to this pass, ’tis plain that our Princes must subsist suitable to their high State and Condition, in the best manner we are able to provide for them.  And whilst the Calling and Duration of Parliaments was precarious, it might indeed be an Act of Imprudence, tho not of Injustice, for any one Parliament to settle such a Sort of Revenue for Life on the Prince:  But at present, when all the World knows the utmost Extent of a Parliament’s possible Duration, it seems disagreeable to Reason, and an Encroachment upon the Right of succeeding Parliaments (for the future) for any one Parliament to do that which another cannot undo, or has not Power to do in its turn.

An Old Whig is for chusing such Sort of Representatives to serve in Parliament, as have Estates in the Kingdom; and those not fleeting ones, which may be sent beyond Sea by Bills of Exchange by every Pacquet-Boat, but fix’d and permanent.  To which end, every Merchant, Banker, or other money’d Man, who is ambitious of serving his Country as a Senator, shou’d have also a competent, visible Land Estate, as a Pledge to his Electors that he intends to abide by them, and has the same Interest with theirs in the publick Taxes, Gains and Losses.  I have heard and weigh’d the Arguments of those who, in Opposition to this, urged the Unfitness of such, whose Lands were engaged in Debts and Mortgages, to serve in Parliament, in comparison with the mony’d Man who had no Land: But those Arguments never convinced me.